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Christians affirm with Jews and Muslims the oneness of God, which is affirmed in the 
Old Testament by the verse, “Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God, the Lord is one.”   Christians 1
have also traditionally affirmed the doctrine of the Trinity, which holds that the Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit are God, “their glory equal, their majesty coeternal,” as the Athanasian Creed 
affirms.   The entire Athanasian Creed is laced with language that may, ​prima facie​, appear to be 2
strictly contradictory.  The Creed affirms that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are eternal and yet 
affirm that only one God exists.   The great challenge of Christian philosophical theology 3
concerning the Trinity is to explain how God could be both three and one.  This is the chief 
problem with which any ​trinitarian​ Christian theologian or philosopher must wrestle.   In 4
response to this, philosophical theologians have proposed several models of the Trinity that seek 
to be both logically coherent and theologically sound.  Of these, I will focus on Trinity 
Monotheism. 
Before I address Trinity monotheism, however, some terms must be defined.  Models of 
the Trinity attempt to strike a balance between unitarianism, the view that God is one being ​and 
one person, and tritheism, the view that three gods exist.  Various models, such as Richard 
Swinburne’s, are criticized for their tritheism, whereas some philosophers, such as, for example, 
Daniel Howard-Snyder, are criticized for their commitment to God as ​a​ person, which implies 
unitarianism.   Striking that balance, then, is clearly difficult, and we will have to address 5
1 ​Deut. 6:4 ESV 
2 ​The Athanasian Creed can be found at Christian Reformed Church, “Athanasian Creed," ​Christian Reformed 
Church​, 18 October 2018, ​https://www.crcna.org/welcome/beliefs/creeds/athanasian-creed​.  This translation of the 
Athanasian Creed was completed in 1988, as is stated on the webpage. 
3 ​Ibid. 
4 ​I add the caveat of ​trinitarian​ Christian to point out that there are non-trinitarian doctrines, but these are generally 
rejected as heretical-and are rejected as such in the Athanasian Creed-and don’t represent the majority of Christians, 
lay or scholar. 
5 ​William Lane Craig criticizes Howard-Snyder in this way in William Lane Craig, “Trinity Monotheism Once 
More: A Response to Daniel Howard-Snyder,” ​Philosophia Christi​ 8, no. 1 (2006): 106. 
 
whether or not Trinity Monotheism does this well.  Also important to this paper will be the 
distinction between ​being​ and ​person​ and what is referred to when words such as “the Persons” 
and “God” are used.  What does it mean to say something like, “The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit 
are God,” and, “One God exists”?  Finally, in order to be theologically sound as a ​Christian 
doctrine, the model should be consistent with what the Bible says concerning God, otherwise 
called the biblical data.  Not all of these issues can be addressed in detail in this paper, but some 
issues can be broached. 
With this in mind, what is Trinity Monotheism?  William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland’s 
account of Trinity Monotheism is both too detailed and too technical to be covered completely in 
the space available, but a concise definition can be proposed and analyzed.  At its heart, Trinity 
Monotheism, according to Craig and Moreland, holds to the view “that while the persons of the 
Trinity are divine, it is the Trinity as a whole that is properly God.”   This model involves two 6
claims, which are crucial to the truth of the model.  The first is that the Trinity is absolutely 
identical to God; to say that God exists ​is just to say​ that the Trinity exists.  The second, which is 
closely related to the first, is that the “is” of the statement, “The Father is God,” is different from 
the “is” of the statement, “The Trinity is God.”  In the former statement, the meaning of “is” is 
attributive; the Father is not ​a​ God but rather has the property of divinity.  In the latter statement, 
the “is” is of identity; the meaning of this statement is the same as if one were saying, “The 
Trinity=God.”  This is key because, if ​p​ is identical to ​r​, and ​q​ is identical to ​r​, then ​p​ is identical 
to ​q​.  In the same way, this argument could be made: 
1. The Father=God. 
6 ​J.P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, ​Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview​ (Illinois: IVP 
Academic, 2003), 589. 
 
2. The Son=God. 
3. Therefore, the Father=the Son. 
But this isn’t what Trinity Monotheism claims.  The Father is not ​a​ God.  By attributing divinity 
to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit while maintaining that only one God, the Trinity as a whole, 
exists, the first and second premises are negated, rendering the above argument unsound. 
But how are we to think of this?  According to Moreland and Craig, we can think of this 
as a part-whole relationship, according to which the Persons of the Trinity (the Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit) are divine “parts,” as it were, of the Trinity as a whole, who is uniquely the one true 
God (or, as they put it, the only instance of the divine nature).   This requires that there are two 7
ways to be divine.  Using the analogy of a cat, they argue that one way to be feline is to be “a 
proper part of a cat,” whereas the cat is feline in virtue of being a cat.  Yet the cat is the only 
instance of the ​feline nature​, in which case only one cat exists.  Multiple cats don’t exist in virtue 
of the kidneys, lungs, heart, etc. being feline.  Yet both the organs of the cat and the cat are truly 
feline.   This merely describes the part-whole relationship between the Persons and the Trinity, 8
however, and not how three centers of consciousness aren’t three separate individual beings, 
rather than one being.  Here, Moreland and Craig use the mythical three-headed dog, Cerberus, 
as an analogy.  If we were to name the three centers of consciousness (the three heads) Rover, 
Bowser, and Spike and endow them with all of the properties, such as rationality and 
self-consciousness, which are indicative of persons, then it is clear, they claim, that Cerberus ​is 
7 ​Moreland and Craig make this claim when they say that “the Trinity is the only instance of the divine nature, and 
therefore there is but one God.”  J.P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, ​Philosophical Foundations for a Christian 
Worldview​ (Illinois: IVP Academic, 2003), 590. 
8 ​Ibid., 591. 
 
one dog​, not three, and yet that three centers of consciousness exist.   Rover could speak with 9
Bowser, and Bowser with Spike, and so on.  Further, the name Cerberus refers to the “whole,” as 
it were, or the one dog itself. 
One might argue that the analogy is not a good one, since Cerberus is a physical being. 
How can ​unembodied​ minds not be three individual beings?  To this, Moreland and Craig ask us 
to consider the soul of a human person.  According to mind-body dualism, the mind or soul 
exists independently of the body.  In humans, the mind is endowed with rationality and 
self-awareness, which we associate with the property of personhood.  Thus, we could say that the 
human soul is endowed with only that set of properties sufficient for the personhood of one 
center of consciousness.   If we think of God in the same way, as a soul, then why can’t we say 10
that God has ​three ​sets of rational faculties?  The Persons simply share the one soul, which we 
call God.  As such, God is not ​a ​Person, in the same sense that the Father is, but He is personal, 
since He is endowed with such faculties in virtue of the Persons. 
With Moreland and Craig’s model explicated, we can now analyze it.  It is important to 
note that what is called Trinity Monotheism according to Moreland and Craig is ​not​ necessarily 
typical of all proponents of Trinity Monotheism.  William Hasker’s survey of social 
trinitarianism, in which he outlines Brian Leftow’s critique of Trinity Monotheism, proves this 
point, since the authors that he cites (and, consequently, that Leftow cites) hold that each Person, 
taken individually, is not “fully God.”   By holding that the Persons are not fully God, 11
9 ​J.P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, ​Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview​ (Illinois: IVP 
Academic, 2003), 593. 
10 ​Ibid., 594. 
11 ​William Hasker, “Objections to Social Trinitarianism,” ​Religious Studies ​46, no. 4 (2010): 429.  I object here to 
the use of the phrase “fully God.”  It is difficult to understand exactly what it means to be “fully” something.  As 
Hasker makes clear, what the Trinity Monotheists to which he’s referring mean is that none of the Persons 
exemplify the divine superlative attributes, though the Trinity as a whole does.  This seems to me to amount to the 
 
monotheism is maintained, since only God, as the Trinity, has those attributes necessary for full 
divinity.  The Persons can be called God only in virtue of their “membership in the Trinity.”  12
Contrast this with Moreland and Craig’s model, which holds that the Trinity as a whole is 
omnipotent, omniscient, and the like only in virtue of the Persons.  Since the Persons exemplify 
these divine attributes, the Trinity does as well.  In fact, for Craig, this makes God more worthy 
of worship than a “more meagerly endowed soul,” that is, a soul with only one set of rational 
faculties.   It is important to note again that on Moreland and Craig’s model, there are two ways 13
to be divine, in the same way that there are two ways to be feline.  These issues are interrelated 
and will inform my response to Howard-Snyder and to Trinity Monotheism itself. 
Howard-Snyder objects to Trinity Monotheism on many fronts, and his critique is much 
too detailed and lengthy for a full response.  But I find his so-called Diminished Divinity 
objection most interesting.  This is one of his shortest and most tentative objections to their 
model, but I think that it is important to his understanding of the model.  He grants that if there 
are two ways to be divine, both by being the Trinity and by being a proper part of the Trinity, 
then this avoids the objection that four instances of the divine nature exist, namely, the Father, 
Son, Holy Spirit, and the Trinity itself.  According to Howard-Snyder, however, this results in a 
situation in which the Persons exemplify a diminished divinity compared to that of the Trinity. 
As he states, if the Persons are divine because they are proper parts of the Trinity, “then they are 
no more God-like than a feline skeleton is cat-like.”  14
notion that none of the Persons is ​truly​ God, which will be important in my analysis of Howard-Snyder’s 
Diminished Divinity objection later in this paper. 
12 ​Ibid. 
13 ​William Lane Craig, “Trinity Monotheism Once More: A Response to Daniel Howard-Snyder,” ​Philosophia 
Christi​ 8, no. 1 (2006): 106. 
14 ​Daniel Howard-Snyder, “Trinity Monotheism,” ​Philosophia Christi​ 5, no. 2 (2003): 379. 
 
Here, it seems to me that Howard-Snyder’s objection is mistaken for two reasons.  The 
first is that he seems to misunderstand what the analogy is intended to represent.  Obviously, the 
skeleton of a cat doesn’t exemplify all of the properties (eg. soft fur, an affinity for yarn, etc.) 
essential to being a cat.  That there are two ways to be feline only shows that the property of 
felinity, which we could call ​f​, can be exemplified in two ways, either by being a cat or by being 
a proper part of a cat.  In the same way, the Persons of the Trinity and the Trinity as a whole 
share the property of being divine, which we could call ​d​, since ​d​ can be exemplified in two 
different ways.  That the cat and the skeleton of the cat share the property ​f​ is what is important 
about the analogy, not to what extent the skeleton of a cat is a cat.  In fact, it is probable that 
having a feline skeleton is essential to being a cat, in which case the feline skeleton of a cat 
clearly couldn’t be a cat.  It ​just is​ the skeleton of a cat.  Therefore, at face value, 
Howard-Snyder’s objection fails, since it misunderstands what the cat analogy is intended to 
represent. 
Second, and more importantly, the objection is fallacious, for it argues that since the 
part-whole relationship of the Persons to the Trinity as a whole is like that of the skeleton of a cat 
to the cat, then the Persons are just as God-like, relative to the Trinity, as the skeleton of a cat is 
cat-like, relative to the cat.  This is related to my first point.  The analogy merely shows that a 
property can be exemplified in two different ways, such that the part shares a certain property 
with the whole.  The similarity of the part to the whole with respect to other properties is 
irrelevant.  In either case, it clearly doesn’t follow that because the skeleton of the cat and the cat 
are dissimilar, then the Persons of the Trinity and the Trinity are dissimilar.  In fact, it is possible 
that the only property that the Trinity exemplifies and not the Persons is the property of being 
 
triune.  Since this property is absolutely identical to being ​a ​God, or an instance of the divine 
nature, then this is an important difference, but it wouldn’t make the Persons any less ​divine​ than 
the Trinity.  In this case, the fact that the Persons and the Trinity share ​d​ doesn’t imply anything 
about how dissimilar they are with regard to their other properties. 
Let’s explore this a bit further.  If we consider which properties there are in the Persons 
and the Trinity, we could consider a conjunction of properties, according to which omniscience 
would be ​OS​, omnipotence would be ​OP​, omnipresence would be ​OPR​, moral perfection would 
be ​MP​, and so on.  If these properties are necessary for being divine, along with either being the 
Trinity (symbolized as ​TR​) or being a proper part of the Trinity (symbolized as ​PP​), then the 
natures of the Persons could be symbolized as such: 
The Father: {​OS & OP & OPR & MP & PP​…} 
The Son: {​OS & OP & OPR & MP & PP​…} 
The Holy Spirit: {​OS & OP & OPR & MP & PP​…}  15
In almost every way, the Trinity as a whole is identical, except for the fact that it exemplifies the 
divine nature or is ​a​ God, as can be symbolized by ​DN​.  The Trinity is also divine with respect to 
TR​, not ​PP​.  This can be symbolized in this way: 
The Trinity: {​OS & OP & OPR & MP & TR & DN​…}  16
This, I think, gives us a good answer to Howard-Snyder’s Diminished Divinity Problem. 
If there are two ways to be divine, which the Persons and the Trinity all exemplify, then the 
15 ​My claim is not that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are identical with each other.  With respect to those 
properties essential to divinity, the Persons share those properties.  We also shouldn’t think of a property like 
omnipotence as a ​way to be divine​ but instead as a necessary property for being divine, and this seems quite natural 
to suppose.  What would it mean to be “a proper part of the Trinity” and yet not omnipotent? 
16 ​Another difference between the Trinity as a whole and the Persons is that only the Trinity is tri-personal, whereas 
the Persons are not.  Since being tri-personal is in itself just what it means to be the Trinity, then tri-personality 
seems necessary for being an instance of the divine nature as well. 
 
question is not ​how ​divine the Persons are.  They both share the property ​d​.  It is how dissimilar 
they are, given that the Persons are proper parts of the Trinity but are not themselves Gods.  I 
have tried to show, just as Moreland and Craig have, that claiming that the Persons and the 
Trinity are divine in two different ways in no way undermines the worth of the Persons to be 
worshiped and awed. 
Speaking to the other elements of Trinity Monotheism, I find the model both plausible (or 
more plausible than its alternatives) and remarkably simple.  It seems to be in line with the 
biblical data as well.  Howard-Snyder’s critique is important because it forces proponents of 
Moreland and Craig’s model to defend and give greater precision and clarification to the model. 
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